Taking RISPs: Who is to Blame for the Indians Failures with Runners On?

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There have been some incredible numbers making the rounds of late that have to do with the Indians offense and, while there are many permutations, one thing that stays the same is that there seems to be an issues with runners in scoring position (RISP). For all the numbers at the same time, check the chart below (accurate as of 6/23):

Indians AB R AVG OBP SLG OPS MLB Rank
Bases Empty 1291 40 .258 .323 .414 .738 2nd
Runners On 1021 237 .240 .327 .354 .680 28th
RISP 563 211 .224 .325 .346 .671 25th
RISP, 2 Outs 266 68 .169 .307 .267 .574 28th
Bases Loaded 54 31 .148 .197 .185 .382 30th

While the final four rows may seem disappointing, it is the the top row that makes them infuriating. In situations where the pitcher should be at his most worried, the Indians safely reach base less than 20% of the time, hitting safely less than 15% of the time. It isn’t surprising that the Indians are ranked last in the league in OPS in these situations, but it may be a surprise that they are second in OPS without anyone on. The simple solution would be to say the Indians aren’t clutch and move on, so I guess we’ll see you later on twitter.

You should know better than that. We need to look at least a little deeper into the numbers above. First, those numbers include the whole team, which isn’t really fair as not everyone gets the same amount of chances with runners on and not everyone could possibly be equally terrible.

RISP Bases Empty Season
AB AVG OBP AB AVG OBP AB AVG OBP
Kipnis 48 .313 .413 184 .337 .413 272 .346 .422
Brantley 67 .328 .435 117 .248 .313 231 .294 .371
Moss 73 .192 .271 118 .246 .321 231 .229 .307
Santana 68 .206 .367 105 .238 .360 222 .212 .355
Bourn 44 .182 .302 119 .244 .302 198 .237 .309
Murphy 34 .324 .359 82 .354 .391 140 .321 .362
Perez 23 .217 .375 64 .234 .355 105 .210 .346
Raburn 31 .290 .425 44 .273 .319 100 .280 .360
Gomes 20 .050 .120 52 .231 .231 93 .204 .214

Above are the numbers for the Indians regulars in situations with runners in scoring position or not at all with the season numbers available for comparison. There are a few interesting points here that can remove a few players from guilt. Jason Kipnis, David Murphy, Ryan Raburn and Roberto Perez have essentially been the exact same hitter in both situations. Of these, Kipnis and Murphy have actually been very positive with runners in scoring position.

AB w/RISP AB w/0 On
Kipnis 17.6% 67.6%
Brantley 29.0% 50.6%
Moss 31.6% 51.1%
Santana 30.6% 47.3%
Bourn 22.2% 60.1%
Murphy 24.3% 58.6%
Perez 21.9% 61.0%
Raburn 31.0% 44.0%
Gomes 21.5% 55.9%

The above table makes it a little easier to see the discrepancy in chances with runners on for each player. Note that the two players noted above as performing particularly well in run scoring opportunities, Kipnis and Murphy, have hit with runners in scoring position in less than 25% of their at bats. Going on the other side, the two players with the most at bats with RISP are Carlos Santana and Brandon Moss, two of the worst hitters for average overall and the two with the biggest negative differential between at bats with none on and at bats with RISP. The batter with the third most at bats with RISP is Michael Brantley and he has been significantly better in these situations than in any other.

In order for the Indians to be so awful as a team, the struggles of Santana, Moss and others have had to completely outweigh the successes of Brantley. Simply by hitting so well behind Kipnis, Brantley has been responsible for 32% of Kipnis’ runs scored and Kipnis 42% of Brantley’s RBI. This is important as, despite all the opportunities, Moss and Santana have knocked in Kipnis a total of just 15 times this year, the same number that Brantley has alone. No other hitter in the lineup has knocked Kipnis in more than three times this year.

While the negative numbers of Lonnie Chisenhall and Jose Ramirez were not included in the player chart (they were in the team chart), there are two positions that are still causing significant problems in the Indians order that have yet to be mentioned, center field and catcher. To begin, Michael Bourn was originally the lead-off hitter, so only 22% of his at bats have come with RISP, but those have been awful.

Even though most of his success has come after his demotion to the bottom of the lineup on April 26th (.187/.267/.231 prior to May 8th, .280/.345/.336 since), he has not been able to hit better with runners in scoring position. Since his OBP has maintained the same rate (as has Carlos Santana) he is obviously not losing control of the strike zone, but there is a possibility that he is changing his batting style with runners on. Considering just outcomes, his ground ball to fly ball rate has been 1.35 with none on, but 1.29 with runners on, showing a slight tendency to hit the ball in the air when he wants to go after that RBI.

Taking RISPs: Who is to Blame for the Indians Failures with Runners On?Taking RISPs: Who is to Blame for the Indians Failures with Runners On?

The two charts above (for a better view and more information, check out the originals on BrooksBaseball.net) put together show something interesting about Bourn. When he hits the ball on the ground, he tends to pull it and when he hits it in the air, he goes the other way (his line drives are pretty well spread throughout). It should be fairly obvious at this point that if Bourn wants to continue rallies with hits, he should be attempting to pull and hitting it on the ground even more than normal. Despite all those fly balls to left and left center, he has just two hits all season to deep left or left center with almost all his hits going to right.

Forgiving Yan Gomes and Roberto Perez for their lack of at bats, Santana’s situation is almost identical to Bourn’s. His OBP with RISP is just 7/10ths of a percent lower than with none on, yet his average is 3.2% less. Santana certainly doesn’t seem to be more aggressive with runners on, in fact, he has walked 19 times in 90 plate appearances with RISP compared to 20 in 125 with bases empty, so it is quite the opposite. However, when he does swing, like Bourn, he is swinging big. His ground ball rate with none on falls from 1.38 to 1.16 with runners in scoring position, showing an even greater tendency than Bourn to swing for power when an RBI opportunity presents itself.

It is an old baseball adage to stay within yourself and while it may be a cliche, like many cliche’s it is based in truth. Carlos Santana is a great hitter, but when he gets stats in his eyes, he tries to become a hitter that he isn’t. The veteran Bourn falls into the same trap. The Indians best hitter in any situation, Kipnis, hits more ground balls with RISP (1.83) than he does with none on (1.39) and because of this, his success with runners on shouldn’t be a surprise. With a runner on second or third, a ground ball to first can be a positive even if it is an out while a fly to left or center is likely to be just a free out. With the infield in, this is even more true as holes open all around the infield.

The Indians hitting coach, Ty Van Burkleo, has been under fire in the (social) media recently and possibly for better reasons than the usual scape goat firing. Of these reasons, the fact that he has not fixed the strategy with runners on of Santana and Bourn should mean much more than the simple fact that the Indians are the worst team in baseball with the bases loaded. Before any rash decisions are made, a more thorough internal look is needed including a search for a significantly better replacement, but if there is one job of the batting coach, it is to fix problems like these and those of Chisenhall and Ramirez early on, without trips to AAA. Luck has entered into it to a point (the Indians are 29th in MLB in BABIP with runners in scoring position), but batting average on balls in play is also affected by the type of hit, something a batter has some control over.

Blaming the problem on luck won’t solve anything, but changing certain hitters approach at the plate could. Of course, Van Burkleo has been unable to convince the Indians sluggers (and Bourn) to do this at this point. Maybe, since the Chris Antonetti felt the best way to cure Chisenhall and Ramirez of the holes in their swing was to send them to AAA (and it appears to have been the correct assumption), maybe it would be convenient to bring AAA batting coach Rouglas Odor to Cleveland rather than sending half the Indians lineup down to Columbus for a quick fix.

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