On Sunday, April 26th Terry Francona finally made the leap that many have been clamoring for since late 2013 by moving Michael Bourn out of the lead-off spot in the lineup. Without the traditional speedy outfielder who bats near .300 and steals a lot of bases available, Francona saddled Jason Kipnis into that lead-off role and it was the best decision he has made in a long time.
Kipnis has played in every Indians game this year and in those first 16, he batted .239/.254/.269 with one extra base hit, two walks and 11 strike outs (71 plate appearances). While he took an 0/4 in his debut in the lead-off role, since then, the numbers have turned around and he has batted .333/.442/.667 with six walks, six extra base hits and four strike outs from that spot (43 PA). While we could simply say that it was just a matter of time and his averages regressing towards his career levels and other words of little value, there are more substantive things to look at, such as the two charts below.
Provided by BrooksBaseball.net (click the pictures for a more detailed version), these charts are from the opening of the 2015 season through 4/25 (when he batted second or third in all but one game) and from 4/26 through 5/5 (all stats through last Tuesday’s game although he did go 2/4 with a walk, double and RBI yesterday). While total numbers and percentages are given, the color coding is enough to judge the situation. From bright red to bright blue, the squares that are red show Kipnis’ zones where he swings often and the blue are where he is more patient. Since making the change in order, Kipnis has become a much more selective hitter, particularly on pitches outside the zone.
While these numbers are still a little small to make real judgement, there does seem to be a change in approach for Kipnis and that makes sense given his recent success. A lead-off hitter is expected to take more pitches than any other batter, allowing those behind to see as much as possible before they have to step up to the plate themselves and making the pitcher work hard from the first batter on. This is not something that Bourn was particularly adept at, but that doesn’t mean that Kipnis couldn’t change to fit the role and he has. Taking more poor pitches has not only lead to four more walks since the change than he had before, despite having near half the plate appearances, but has also lead to him swinging exclusively at pitches that are better to hit.
These two charts show Kipnis’ slugging percent on pitches in different zones again from 4/6-25 on the left and 4/26-5/5 on the right. Kipnis hits best on low and inside pitches, befitting the profile of a left handed pull hitter and by taking pitches outside of this zone, he has avoided making easy outs, instead turning what would normally be ground outs into walks and extra base hits.
Bourn has been the lead-off hitter seen his signing prior to the 2013 season, but the Indians have had some recent history with similar success. While he has essentially always been a tremendous hitter, at the beginning of the 2012 season, Shin-Soo Choo was struggling. The normally patient hitter was batting just .235/.361/.333 with 16 walks compared to 25 strike outs. On May 14th, he was installed into the lead-off role, a job he kept until August 3rd, then regained on August 31st through the rest of the season. From May 14th on, he batted .293/.376/.465 with 15 home runs and 57 walks.
For Choo, these charts are similar to the first two shown for Kipnis. While Choo had a significantly better idea of the strike zone than Kipnis ever has, even he had a significant change in pitch selection once moved to the lead-off spot.
This actually brings up an interesting contention. Choo’s career swing map looks almost identical to the one on the right, whether he was hitting lead-off or not and that makes the numbers on the left look more like a simple slump. Blaming Kipnis’ 2014 issues completely on his oblique injury (which isn’t too far off base considering his change in defensive play that year compared to every other season including 2015), it is possible he simply started this year off with a slump that would have went away no matter what.
Even if this is the case, the rare move by Francona seems to have sparked a more immediate change than would otherwise have occurred naturally. Like Choo in 2012, this could mean that any progress gained by Kipnis’ move would be maintained even if he were removed from the role. At the moment, however, there seems little reason for him to be moved at all, especially considering the lack of obvious replacements.
Since the preliminary move on April 26th, the Indians have went from averaging 3.6 runs per game to 5.2 per game and, while this is not entirely due to Kipnis batting first instead of Bourn, the change certainly hasn’t hurt. Taking two below average hitters (Bourn and Kipnis) and replacing them with a more selective Kipnis and now Carlos Santana, who could get on base 20% of the time even if he never got a hit, the Indians are proving how much lineup construction really does matter. With two guys who can get on base regularly batting in front of Michael Brantley, at least one of the Indians many problems appears to be solved.
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