The Argument for Flipping the Michaels

With most of the roster decided before pitchers and catchers even reported and few real new additions to talk about, relatively unimportant positional debates can begun earlier than normal. In this particular case, it is the argument that Michael Bourn and Michael Brantley should be flipped in the outfield, despite Brantley’s “comfort level” and Bourn’s “experience.”

To begin, there may seem no obvious need for a change. The chart above (stats from Fangraphs) shows the career defensive numbers for both Bourn and Brantley at the two positions in question. Considering that Bourn has very limited experience in left, it is plain to see that over their career, Brantley has been better in left and Bourn better in center. Of course, the year 2015 will not feature some kind of video game amalgamation of their entire careers but a 32 year old Bourn and 27 year old Brantley.

This chart, showing the most recent season each player has played at each position, provides a slightly more accurate description of what to expect in 2015. As always, the fangraphs stats are runs saved above average and the UZR/150 spreads that stat out as if he had played 150 games at that position. Again, while the 2007 numbers aren’t particularly useful, Brantley’s time in center while Bourn was injured in 2014 are. While his arm numbers seem less impressive in center than left, this is likely because of lack of opportunities and runners who learned to fear him throughout the years. There are also less legitimate opportunities for outfield assists from center field because of the greater distances involved, one reason why outfielders with weaker arms (like Bourn) are often hidden there.

The two charts (single season center field UZR/150 for both players) to the right further show the fallacy in the original career numbers. As the years have progressed, Bourn has declined greatly since his prime when he won Gold Gloves in 2009 and 2010 while Brantley is still progressing. While he didn’t play center field in 2013, Brantley has improved defensively every other season since then. Of course, these numbers make sense as generally baseball players improve or maintain through their age 30 season, then begin to decline, but that goes against the veteran value mentality.

This is not meant to be disrespectful to Michael Bourn, but to make him a more valuable player. As he continues to slow and his weak arm becomes more apparent, decreasing the range he is expected to cover should make him a much better defender. On the other side, Brantley’s great speed and arm are being wasted in left. While there aren’t quite as many assists available from that position, simply keeping runners from taking an extra base is an underrated skill. It is hard to quantify, especially compared to an actual removed base runner, but there is a definite value in fear.

The real reason for the switch, however, is not the arm, but the legs. In Cleveland, especially, the left fielder is responsible for a very small batch of grass. This is possibly part of the reason Brantley has been underrated defensively as balls he could have caught otherwise hit somewhere a little too high off the twenty foot wall in left. Simply the existence of that wall makes a left fielder play defense differently, removing aggressiveness as the fielder needs to turn around and wait for the return off the wall. While this likely increased Brantley’s assists, especially runners who thought that a ball of the wall was an automatic double, it decreased his total outs made in the air.

In center field, Brantley would be able to run free. The chart to the right shows personally calculated base running numbers, adding extra bases to steals for the first column and tag outs and times caught stealing in the second. The final column shows the success rate when attempting to take an extra base. While this doesn’t directly correlate to defense, it does show that Brantley is smarter and faster on his feet than Bourn in addition to being more aggressive. These traits are wasted in left and could make him one of the best center fielders in baseball.

Back to Bourn, there is one more significant reason for this flip. As Brantley’s underused legs make him a great candidate for center, Bourn’s could use a break. By my own count, Bourn missed 51 games in 2014 due to hamstring injuries, not including the final weeks of Spring Training which put him behind when he finally did start the season a few weeks after everyone else. In addition to becoming a better defender in left, Bourn could simply play more. By decreasing the ground he has to cover, he could save his legs for the bases, where they are much more important, and hopefully, keep himself on the active roster.

This solution may go against the norm, but it seems an obvious solution to multiple different real problems. The switch would make both Brantley and Bourn more valuable defensively, help improve the team defense as a whole since Brantley could help cover some of right field where Brandon Moss has limited range and help keep Bourn on the field by decreasing the stress on his fragile hamstrings. This would be a proactive move rather than reactive, such as waiting to move Brantley to center until after Bourn is injured again. It may go against the Indians standard, but a move like this now could help keep extremely poor outfielders, like Mike Aviles and Ryan Raburn, out of center field in the future.

On a final note, Bourn is under contract through 2016, but will almost certainly not be returning even for his option year in 2017. Brantley, on the other hand, is already signed through 2017 and the Indians will certainly be looking to extend him again before that time comes. By setting the standard with Brantley in center now, they can establish that position for the next three years. That is, unless by then it will be time for another argument about how Tyler Naquin deserves to play center more than the aging Brantley.